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Draft v0.1 · no external audit yet. Source:wala pang external audit. Pinagmulan: src/features/threats/threats.ts → THREAT-MODEL.md

nel-chain threat model and audit checklist

Generated from src/features/threats/threats.ts by npm run threats; do not edit by hand. Version 0.1, a draft for a future external audit. No external audit has been done.

44 threats: 16 mitigated, 27 partial, 1 open. Each entry names the attacker, the defense in the code, what remains, and the files and tests to check. Categories follow STRIDE.

Not yet mitigated

IDAreaThreatStatusResidual risk
T01IdentityFake person through two colluding attestersPartialFakes up to the daily cap still get in until someone notices; detection depends on audits and courts outside the chain.
T02IdentityStolen attester keyPartialThere is no on-chain rotation of an attester key: a jailed attester needs a new genesis or a future governance transaction to return.
T03IdentityOne person, two Soul IDsPartialUniqueness is only as good as PhilSys deduplication; people without PhilSys must register first.
T05IdentityFalse death reportPartialSomeone who cannot reach a device during the whole grace period (30 days in the mainnet draft) loses the money to their beneficiary; the chain cannot undo it, so it must be recovered between people or through a court.
T06IdentityGuessing ID numbers from the person hashPartialAny attester holding the salt can still test guesses. Masked names and barangays leak a little.
T34IdentityLeak of biometric dataPartialPhilSys and each attester still hold biometrics off-chain, under the Data Privacy Act; a breach there is outside the chain's control and permanent.
T35IdentityFooling the face or fingerprint checkPartialThe chain cannot verify that liveness really happened; it records the attester's or voucher's word, and strikes are the consequence if they lied. A skilled deepfake on a screen held to the camera may still pass the on-device check.
T40IdentityVouching ringsPartialWithout an ID registry there is no deduplication: a patient ring can still grow slowly, and nothing stops one real person from being vouched twice on two addresses by complicit friends.
T09ConsensusCapturing the committeePartialRests entirely on identity: an attacker who fakes or recruits a large share of staking people (T01) breaks it.
T11ConsensusLong-range attack with retired keysPartialBlocks after the newest checkpoint are still unprotected for a node syncing only from attacker peers, so checkpoints must be refreshed in every release; the lists are empty until a public testnet runs.
T43ConsensusStolen validator node keyPartialUntil the owner rotates, the thief can double-vote and get the stake slashed. Phase 59 nodes that still run with the wallet key itself remain exposed until they switch (npm run validator -- --new-key).
T13ConsensusBootstrap validators stalling or forking the young chainPartialUntil then they can stall the chain; operators should be independent people.
T14ConsensusCensoring transactionsPartialA large colluding group can delay transactions for many blocks; there is no forced-inclusion rule.
T15ConsensusQuantum computer forging consensus signaturesOpenVotes and the VRF still use Ed25519; there is no standard post-quantum VRF yet.
T37Wallet and usersPayer walking away from channel paymentsPartialThe store must claim before expiry and must not lose its latest voucher; a lost phone means lost payments since the last claim.
T21NetworkEclipse attackPartialAn attacker with addresses in many networks can still try; there is no ASN map yet.
T23NetworkPlain WebSocket for browsersPartialWithout the proxy, balances and lookups are readable on the path, and a fake node can lie about them.
T38NetworkAttacking the operator's home computer through the tunnelPartialA bug in the node or the web app would be reachable from the internet on the operator's own computer; while the operator is the only validator host, the testnet stops when that computer is off.
T25Wallet and usersPaying a scammerPartialWarnings do not block payments, and a final payment cannot be reversed.
T27Wallet and usersGuessing the PIN of a copied walletPartialOne million PINs is still a small space for a determined attacker; passkeys (secure hardware) are the real fix. Backup codes, which leave the device, require a password of 10 or more characters instead of the PIN; a weak password chosen anyway can still be guessed offline.
T28Wallet and usersScript injection in the web appPartialInline scripts are still allowed ('unsafe-inline'), because partial prerendering cannot use nonces; and WebSocket connections may go to any host, because users choose their own node.
T29InstitutionsUnbacked digital pesosPartialIssuer and auditor together can hide a shortfall. NEL is unaffected.
T30InstitutionsAbuse of lawful disclosurePartialCourt plus one other trustee can de-anonymize anyone; the protection is visibility, not prevention.
T31InstitutionsLeaked institution key filePartialNo on-chain key rotation for institutions; no hardware security module support.
T32EconomicsInflating the supply with fake peoplePartialGrants already spent before a revocation stay in circulation.
T44Wallet and usersGuardians colluding to take an accountPartialAn owner who does not open the wallet during the delay loses the account; a thief holding the owner's key can cancel a majority recovery, so recovering from theft then needs every guardian. The Soul ID check on guardians is done by the wallet, not by the chain.
T42EconomicsQuietly changing the money rulesPartialThe fingerprint covers the declared numbers and the name of the burn-cap formula, not the code of every formula; reviewers and the economics tests guard the formulas themselves.
T33EconomicsFront-running swapsPartialWithin its own block a proposer can still order transactions as it likes.

Identity

T01. Fake person through two colluding attesters

Partial · Spoofing

T02. Stolen attester key

Partial · Elevation of privilege

T03. One person, two Soul IDs

Partial · Spoofing

T04. Linking someone else's address as a signing key

Mitigated · Spoofing

T05. False death report

Partial · Denial of service

T06. Guessing ID numbers from the person hash

Partial · Information disclosure

T34. Leak of biometric data

Partial · Information disclosure

T35. Fooling the face or fingerprint check

Partial · Spoofing

T40. Vouching rings

Partial · Spoofing

Consensus

T07. Double voting (equivocation)

Mitigated · Tampering

T08. Knocking the next proposer offline

Mitigated · Denial of service

T09. Capturing the committee

Partial · Elevation of privilege

T10. Fresh fake identities joining the lottery at once

Mitigated · Elevation of privilege

T11. Long-range attack with retired keys

Partial · Tampering

T43. Stolen validator node key

Partial · Elevation of privilege

T12. Block time set by the proposer

Mitigated · Tampering

T13. Bootstrap validators stalling or forking the young chain

Partial · Denial of service

T14. Censoring transactions

Partial · Denial of service

T15. Quantum computer forging consensus signatures

Open · Spoofing

Ledger

T16. Replaying a transaction

Mitigated · Tampering

T17. Editing a past block

Mitigated · Tampering

T18. Filling blocks with junk

Mitigated · Denial of service

T36. Slowing every node with a large ledger

Mitigated · Denial of service

T19. Moving a locked welcome grant

Mitigated · Elevation of privilege

Network

T20. Flooding a node with messages

Mitigated · Denial of service

T21. Eclipse attack

Partial · Spoofing

T22. Eavesdropping or tampering between nodes

Mitigated · Information disclosure

T23. Plain WebSocket for browsers

Partial · Information disclosure

T24. Running a node out of memory

Mitigated · Denial of service

T38. Attacking the operator's home computer through the tunnel

Partial · Elevation of privilege

T41. Reading or flooding the operator inbox

Mitigated · Information disclosure

Wallet and users

T37. Payer walking away from channel payments

Partial · Repudiation

T25. Paying a scammer

Partial · Spoofing

T26. Stolen phone

Mitigated · Elevation of privilege

T27. Guessing the PIN of a copied wallet

Partial · Information disclosure

T28. Script injection in the web app

Partial · Elevation of privilege

T44. Guardians colluding to take an account

Partial · Elevation of privilege

Institutions

T29. Unbacked digital pesos

Partial · Tampering

T30. Abuse of lawful disclosure

Partial · Information disclosure

T31. Leaked institution key file

Partial · Elevation of privilege

Economics

T32. Inflating the supply with fake people

Partial · Tampering

T42. Quietly changing the money rules

Partial · Tampering

T39. Overcharging fees paid in pesos

Mitigated · Tampering

T33. Front-running swaps

Partial · Tampering

Audit checklist

Items an external auditor should verify. None has been checked by an outside party yet.